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Abstract	
There	 is	 a	 common	 assumption	 that	 evolutionary	 explanations	 of	 religion	 undermine	
religious	 beliefs.	 Do	 etiological	 accounts	 similarly	 affect	 the	 rationality	 of	 religious	
practices?	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 this	 paper	 looks	 at	 two	 influential	 evolutionary	
accounts	of	ritual,	the	hazard-precaution	model	and	costly	signaling	theory.	It	examines	
whether	 Cuneo’s	 account	 of	 ritual	 knowledge	 as	 knowing	 to	 engage	 God	 can	 be	
maintained	in	the	light	of	these	evolutionary	accounts.	While	the	evolutionary	accounts	
under	 consideration	 are	 not	metaphysically	 incompatible	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 religious	
rituals	 engage	 God,	 they	 cast	 doubt	 on	 whether	 many,	 if	 not	 all,	 rituals	 can	 do	 this	
successfully.		
	
1.	Introduction	
	
A	 large	part	of	analytic	philosophy	of	religion	 is	concerned	with	religious	beliefs,	more	
specifically,	with	their	epistemic	standing.	Discussion	has	centered	on	whether	religious	
beliefs	 might	 be	 unwarranted,	 unjustified,	 or	 unreasonable.	 Some	 contemporary	
challenges	to	religious	beliefs	draw	on	evolutionary	etiological	accounts,	proposing	that	
evolutionary	 explanations	 of	 religious	 beliefs	 diminish	 their	 epistemic	 standing	 (e.g.,	
Wilkins	and	Griffiths	2013).	Other	authors	have	sought	to	defend	religious	beliefs	in	the	
light	of	their	evolutionary	origins,	arguing	that	they	are	not	irrational	in	the	light	of	such	
accounts	(e.g.,	Thurow	2013).	
	 Recently,	 the	 focus	 on	 belief	 in	 analytic	 philosophy	 of	 religion	 has	 come	 under	
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scrutiny.	 Cuneo	 (2014,	 2016),	 Coakley	 (2013),	 and	Wettstein	 (2012)	 have	 argued	 that	
philosophers	of	religion	emphasize	religious	belief	at	the	expense	of	practices,	which	are	
at	least	as	important	for	religious	faith	as	beliefs	are.	People	of	faith	engage	in	actions,	
often	 in	a	 standardized	and	 ritualized	 form,	 such	as	praying,	 giving	up	 things	 for	 lent,	
keeping	 kosher,	 wearing	 a	 hijab,	 and	 participating	 in	 liturgies.	 Such	 actions	 are	 an	
integral	 part	 of	 their	 religious	 self-identification.	 Philosophers	 are	 no	 exception:	 in	 a	
recent	survey	among	academic	philosophers	(De	Cruz	2017),	those	who	self-identify	as	
theists	regularly	attend	religious	services,	with	43.1%	attending	weekly,	and	22.3%	more	
than	weekly.	Still,	 few	philosophers	of	 religion	probe	 the	epistemic	 significance	of	 the	
practices	 they	 frequently	 engage	 in.	 As	 a	 result,	 we	 do	 not	 know	 whether	 or	 how	
religious	 rituals	 can	 provide	 one	 with	 knowledge,	 or,	 as	 Coakley	 (2013,	 131)	 puts	 it,	
“how,	if	at	all,	can	liturgy	be	‘true?’”		
	 The	 cognitive	 science	 of	 religion	 (CSR)	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 challenge	 the	 belief-
centered	 focus	 in	 philosophy	of	 religion.	 CSR	 is	 the	 interdisciplinary	 study	of	 religious	
beliefs	and	practices	through	the	examination	of	cognitive	processes	that	underlie	them.	
In	 sharp	 contrast	 to	 the	 focus	 on	 theism	 and	 the	 rationality	 of	 belief	 in	 philosophical	
discourse,	many	religious	practices	 fall	within	CSR’s	ambit,	 including	ancestor-worship,	
episodes	of	spirit	possession,	and	fire-walking	rituals.	This	paper	examines	evolutionary	
explanations	 of	 religious	 practice,	 focusing	 on	 two	 accounts:	 the	 hazard-precaution	
model	for	the	origin	of	rituals,	and	costly	signaling	theory.	 I	 take	Cuneo’s	(2014,	2016,	
chapter	 8)	 account	 of	 the	 Eastern	 Orthodox	 liturgy	 as	 an	 exemplar	 of	 an	 epistemic	
account	 of	 religious	 practices,	 and	 I	 then	 assess	 whether	 evolutionary	 accounts	
challenge	 the	 rationality	 of	 such	 practices.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 etiology	 of	 rituals	
undermines	our	justified	beliefs	about	whether	rituals	can	successfully	engage	God.		
	 There	 are	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 a	 practice	 can	 be	 rational.	 If	 rationality	 is	
understood	purely	 in	 terms	of	practical	 rationality,	 it	 is	 rational	 to	engage	 in	 rituals	 if	
they	 help	 to	 fulfill	 non-doxastic	 aims,	 such	 as	 cultivating	 a	 sense	 of	 awe	 or	 providing	
aesthetic	experiences.	Wettstein	(2012),	for	example,	argues	that	a	full	participation	in	
Jewish	rituals	is	compatible	with	a	skeptical	or	even	naturalistic	attitude.		In	discussions	
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on	 CSR	 and	 rationality,	 the	most	 common	ways	 to	 flesh	 out	 rationality	 is	 in	 terms	 of	
justification.	 Can	 we	 be	 justified	 in	 believing	 –	 given	 the	 evidence	 we	 have	 –	 that	
religious	 practices	 help	 us	 gain	 religious	 knowledge	 of	 some	 sort?	 I	 will	 be	 using	 the	
concept	 of	 rationality	 in	 this	 justificatory	 sense.	 In	 developing	 my	 argument,	 I	 will	
assume	 an	 Anselmian	 concept	 of	 God,	 who	 is	 omnipotent,	 omniscient,	 and	
omnibenevolent.		
	
2.	Can	evolutionary	debunking	arguments	be	applied	to	religious	practices?	
	
There	is	an	enduring	debate	on	whether	etiological	accounts	of	religious	beliefs	should	
undermine	confidence	in	their	veracity.	Hume	(1757)	argued	that	belief	in	God	finds	its	
origin	in	anxiety	and	ignorance	about	causation	of	everyday	events,	such	as	floods	and	
storms.	Prompted	by	an	inability	to	influence	these	events,	humans	anthropomorphize	
their	 environment	 into	 “intelligent,	 voluntary	 agents,	 like	 ourselves;	 only	 somewhat	
superior	 in	 power	 and	 wisdom”	 (section	 V).	 This	 makes	 their	 surroundings	 more	
explicable,	more	familiar,	and	offers	the	illusion	of	control,	as	gods	can	be	appeased	and	
bribed	 (see	 Kail	 2007,	 for	 discussion).	 Hume’s	 account,	 like	 later	 ones	 by	 Feuerbach,	
Marx,	 and	 Freud,	was	 purely	 speculative	 and	 thus	 its	 skeptical	 force	 remains	 limited.	
Only	if	one	assumes	that	the	etiological	account	provides	some	approximation	of	what	
actually	happened	in	the	evolution	of	religious	beliefs,	 is	 it	 incumbent	on	philosophers	
of	religion	to	consider	the	epistemic	consequences	of	these	accounts1.	
	 Since	 the	 emergence	 of	 CSR	 in	 the	 1980s,	 we	 have	 some	 empirical	 footing	 on	
which	to	formulate	etiological	accounts.	To	give	an	example,	cross-cultural	correlational	
studies,	as	well	as	controlled	experiments,	indicate	a	connection	between	moral	norms	
and	religious	beliefs:	believing	in	morally	concerned	supernatural	beings	who	have	the	
power	to	punish	increases	cooperative	behavior	and	discourages	freeriding	or	cheating.	
Participants	 primed	 with	 religious	 concepts	 are	 more	 generous	 in	 experimental	
situations	(Shariff	and	Norenzayan	2007),	and	naturalistic	observations	found	a	“Sunday	
effect”,	 an	 increase	 in	 prosocial	 behavior	 on	 Sundays	 in	 Christians	 (Malhotra	 2010).	
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Large-scale	 societies,	 which	 have	 less	 interpersonal	 social	 control	 than	 small-scale	
societies,	exhibit	a	higher	incidence	of	belief	in	morally	concerned,	powerful	gods	than	
small-scale	societies.	The	prevalence	of	belief	 in	the	Abrahamic	god	and	similar	beings	
can	be	explained	as	a	result	of	humans	organizing	in	large-scale	societies,	and	adopting	
beliefs	that	help	instill	cooperation	and	discourage	self-interest	(see	Norenzayan	2013,	
for	an	extended	treatment	of	this	literature,	but	see	Watts	et	al.	2015,	for	an	argument	
that	 supernatural	 punishment	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 moral	 agents,	 not	 just	 high	 gods,	 is	
effective	 in	 instilling	 cooperation).	Although	 findings	 like	 these	are	 still	 tentative,	 they	
should	 be	 of	 interest	 to	 naturalistically-inclined	 philosophers,	 as	 they	 provide	 an	
empirical	 angle	 on	 long-standing	 philosophical	 debates,	 for	 instance,	 about	 the	
relationship	between	morality	and	religion.	
	 Recently,	 the	anthropologists	 Sosis	 and	Kiper	 (2014)	have	proposed	 that	a	 focus	
on	religious	practices	can	deflect	some	debunking	challenges	to	religion.	Practices	such	
as	 prayer	 and	 ritual	 are	 crucial	 elements	 of	 religion.	 Religion	 is	 a	 complex	 adaptive	
phenomenon,	in	which	beliefs	are	important,	but	not	the	only	(or	often	even	the	main)	
elements	 worthy	 of	 consideration.	 Most	 ordinary	 religious	 believers	 do	 not	 rely	 on	
reasoning	to	uphold	their	beliefs.	Rather,	their	faith	is	sustained	by	rituals,	prayer,	and	
other	 deliberate	 actions.	 Since	 debunking	 arguments	 against	 religion	 are	 usually	 only	
leveled	 against	 its	 doxastic	 aspects,	 Sosis	 and	 Kiper	 (2014,	 257)	 contend	 that	
evolutionary	 explanations	 do	 not,	 on	 the	whole,	 challenge	 the	 rationality	 of	 religious	
faith,	 which	 encompasses	 both	 beliefs	 and	 practices:	 “[W]e	 suggest	 that	 if	 religion	 is	
indeed	a	complex	adaptive	system	that	consists	of	recurring	and	 interacting	elements,	
then	the	veracity	of	or	warrant	for	religious	beliefs	is	not	challenged	by	the	evolutionary	
science	of	religion.”		
	 Sosis	and	Kiper	(2014)	do	not	mean	to	argue	that	religious	systems	are	immune	to	
all	debunking	arguments,	but	rather,	 that	because	religion	 is	more	than	belief,	attacks	
on	 religion	 are	 inherently	 incomplete2.	 However,	 their	 discussion	 leaves	 open	 the	
question	 of	 whether	 religious	 practices	 could	 resist	 debunking	 arguments.	 Recent	
empirical	and	theoretical	work	in	CSR	on	the	etiology	of	religious	practices	is	relevant	for	
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this	question.	I	will	examine	the	philosophical	implications	of	this	work,	taking	Cuneo’s	
recent	account	of	ritual	knowledge	as	a	point	of	focus.		
	
3.	Religious	practices	as	knowing-how	
Terence	Cuneo	 (2014,	 2016,	 chapter	 8)	 offers	 a	 detailed	 account	of	 ritual	 knowledge,	
where	he	puts	the	Eastern	Orthodox	liturgy	forward	as	a	skillful	form	of	knowing-how.	
He	aims	to	reinstate	the	role	of	human	agency	in	philosophical	accounts	of	faith.	In	his	
view,	religious	practices	are	a	way	of	engaging	with	God:	“Christianity	is	...	a	way	of	life	
that	 is	 thoroughly	 practical.	 It	 is	 dedicated	 to	 engaging	God	 in	 various	ways	 by	 doing	
such	things	as	blessing,	petitioning,	and	thanking	God”	(Cuneo	2014,	p.	368).	In	this	way,	
one’s	knowledge	of	God	is	much	richer	and	broader	than	how	epistemologists	typically	
conceive	of	knowledge.	Rituals	provide	a	way	to	be	in	rapport	with	God,	knowing	how	
to	engage	with	this	being,	and	responding	to	what	God	cares	about.	In	brief,	in	Cuneo’s	
account	“the	dictum	that	knowing	God	is	a	species	of	practical	knowledge	 is	the	claim	
that	knowing	God	...	consists	in	(although	is	not	exhausted	by)	knowing	how	to	engage	
God”	 (p.	 369).	 Eastern	 Orthodox	 rituals	 are	 thoroughly	 embodied:	 they	 consist	 of	
carefully	scripted	actions,	such	as	uttering	blessings,	eating	together,	kissing	a	copy	of	
the	 Gospel,	 and	 chanting	 Psalms.	 Each	 of	 these	 events	 has	 multiple	 dimensions;	 for	
instance,	in	the	liturgy	kissing	is	simultaneously	an	act	of	greeting,	adoring,	blessing,	and	
thanking.	
	 How	 can	 we	 evaluate	 the	 epistemological	 import	 of	 such	 practices?	 There	 is	 a	
continued	debate	on	whether	knowledge-how	can	be	reduced	to	a	form	of	knowledge-
that	 (the	 view	 that	 this	 is	 the	 case	 is	 termed	 intellectualism,	 its	 opposite	 anti-
intellectualism,	 see	 Stanley	 and	Williamson	 2001,	 for	 a	 defense	 of	 the	 intellectualist	
position).	Cuneo	 favors	 a	moderate	anti-intellectualist	 stance,	but	 for	 the	purposes	of	
this	paper	it	is	not	required	to	take	a	position	in	this	debate.	Even	under	the	assumption	
that	 intellectualism	 is	 true,	 it	 is	 plausible	 (as,	 e.g.,	 Brogaard	 2012,	 has	 argued)	 that	
knowing-how	 has	 different	 justificatory	 grounds	 than	 knowing-that.	 The	 justificatory	
grounds	of	knowledge-that	include	cognitive	states,	whereas	the	justificatory	grounds	of	
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knowledge-how	involve	practical	abilities.	This	can	explain	why	knowledge-that	is	more	
sensitive	 to	 luck	 conditions	 than	 knowledge-how3	 (Cath	 2012).	 Take,	 for	 instance	
(building	 on	Cuneo	 and	Cath),	Dan,	 the	 amateur	 lutenist,	who	 forms	 a	 justified	 belief	
that	 the	 sheet	music	he	has	 just	bought	contains	 the	accurate	 tablature	of	Dowland’s	
Melancholy	 Galliard.	 His	 belief	 is	 justified	 because	 the	 tablature’s	 publisher	 generally	
takes	 care	 to	 reproduce	 music	 carefully,	 using	 the	 most	 accurate	 early	 versions.	
Unbeknownst	to	Dan,	all	versions	of	this	particular	piece	contain	key	mistakes	because	
they	 perpetuate	 a	 seventeenth-century	 printing	 error.	 It	 just	 so	 happens	 that	 the	
version	 Dan	 has	 bought	 has	 a	 few	 new	 printing	 errors	 (not	 in	 character	 with	 the	
publisher)	 so	 that,	 by	 lucky	 coincidence,	 the	 score	 he	 bought	 really	 is	 an	 accurate	
rendition	of	Melancholy	Galliard	as	Dowland	wrote	 it.	When	Dan	masters	the	piece,	 it	
seems	 he	 really	 knows	 how	 to	 play	Melancholy	 Galliard,	 even	 though	 he	 is	 lucky	 in	
having	 an	 accurate	 version.	 By	 contrast,	 his	 propositional	 belief	 that	 the	 piece	 is	
Melancholy	Galliard	does	not	seem	to	be	knowledge.	
	 Cuneo	 highlights	 two	 elements	 of	 the	 Eastern	Orthodox	 liturgy	 and	 other	 ritual	
practices:	they	have	expressive	content	and	fittingness.	The	competent	performance	of	
these	 practices	 expresses	 something,	 such	 as	 thanking	 or	 honoring.	 Their	 expressive	
content	can	be	evaluated	according	to	their	fittingness.	Fittingness	is	not	just	a	matter	
of	 fitting	 the	 mental	 state	 of	 the	 agent,	 but	 of	 fitting	 the	 situation.	 For	 example,	
someone	might	 feel	 resentful	while	writing	 a	 thank	 you	note	 to	 a	 family	member,	 an	
activity	 she	 resolved	 to	do	every	year.	Although	 the	expressive	content	 (thankfulness)	
does	not	fit	the	mental	state	(resentment),	it	is	still	an	appropriate	response	because	it	
flows	from	the	resolve	of	thanking	the	family	member	yearly	(it	is	fitting).		
	 Ancient	 philosophers	 such	 as	 Aristotle	 drew	 a	 close	 connection	 between	 virtue	
and	practical	skills	(technē),	an	integration	that	is	 largely	lacking	in	current	accounts	of	
skillful	knowing-how	(Annas	2012).	In	Cuneo’s	account,	however,	the	virtues	and	skills	of	
worshippers	are	closely	tied	together,	a	natural	consequence	of	the	God-directedness	of	
the	Eastern	Orthodox	liturgy.	The	blessings	and	other	actions	of	the	liturgy	hone	one’s	
sensibilities	 “in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 one	 begins	 to	 view,	 experience,	 and	 treat	 matter	
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differently	 than	 one	 would	 in	 one’s	 day-to-day	 life”	 (Cuneo	 2014,	 p.	 381).	Wettstein	
(2012)	offers	an	analogous	account	of	Jewish	ritualized	practices,	such	that	reading	the	
Talmud	 or	 uttering	 blessings	 help	 to	 cultivate	 a	 sense	 of	 awe,	 thus	 contributing	 to	
human	flourishing.	
	 According	 to	Cuneo,	 the	 successful	performance	of	 the	Eastern	Orthodox	 liturgy	
allows	 one	 to	 engage	 God,	 and	 thus	 attain	 knowledge	 of	 God	 that	 is	more	 than	 just	
propositional,	but	involves	a	deep,	personal,	relational	knowledge.	As	we	have	seen,	the	
justificatory	grounds	for	knowing-how	are	practical:	if	Sophia	knows	how	to	engage	God,	
she	 has	 the	 practical	 ability	 (through	 liturgical	 actions)	 to	 do	 so.	 At	 this	 point,	
evolutionary	 accounts	 of	 religious	 practices	 become	 relevant.	 Does	 the	 evolutionary	
origin	of	liturgical	actions	cast	doubt	on	one’s	ability	to	successfully	engage	God	through	
liturgy?	 In	 the	next	 sections,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 they	do	cast	doubt	on	 the	 rationality	of	
these	practices.	For	all	we	know,	the	Eastern	Orthodox	liturgy	helps	its	practitioners	to	
engage	God	and	may	thus	confer	knowledge	of	God.	But	the	evolutionary	accounts	of	
ritual	undermine	one’s	 reasons	 for	 thinking	 that	 these	 rituals	 in	 fact	engage	God,	and	
thus	that	they	confer	knowledge.		
	
4.	Two	evolutionary	accounts	of	religious	practices	
	
I	will	now	present	two	influential	evolutionary	accounts	of	religious	practices	from	the	
recent	 CSR	 literature.	 Both	 aim	 to	 explain	 the	 prevalence	 of	 religious	 rituals	 across	
cultures	 in	 terms	 of	 human	 cognitive	 dispositions.	 I	 am	 putting	 them	 forward	 as	
exemplars	of	evolutionary	explanations,	 and	will	not	assess	 their	plausibility.	Rather,	 I	
will	examine	what	the	consequences	are	for	the	rationality	of	ritual	religious	practices	if	
these	evolutionary	explanations	are	correct.		
	
4.1	The	hazard-precaution	model	
Pascal	Boyer	and	Pierre	Liénard	(Boyer	and	Liénard	2006,	Liénard	and	Boyer	2006)	have	
developed	 the	 hazard-precaution	 model,	 a	 detailed	 cognitive	 account	 to	 explain	 the	
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prevalence	of	ritualized	behaviors	across	cultures.	 Its	explanatory	scope	 is	significantly	
broader	 than	 religion,	 encompassing,	 for	 instance,	 rituals	 in	 sports	 as	 well.	 However,	
their	 primary	 interest	 is	 to	 account	 for	 puzzling,	 cross-culturally	 recurring	 features	 of	
religious	rituals.	Ritual	acts	are	meaningless	(e.g.,	ritually	rinsing	utensils	that	are	already	
clean),	 rigid,	 follow	 a	 tight	 script,	 and	 often	 involve	 repetition	 (e.g.,	 walking	 thrice	
around	a	sacrificial	ox	counterclockwise).	This	repetitiveness	is	not	explicitly	motivated	
(e.g.,	why	thrice	and	not	twice?),	but	is	believed	to	be	efficacious.	Rituals	typically	take	
place	 in	a	 specially	delineated	 space,	 such	as	a	 sacred	 circle	or	 church	building.	What	
accounts	for	these	features	of	religious	rituals	(and	ritualized	behavior	more	generally),	
and	their	pervasive	cultural	success?	
	 According	 to	 the	 hazard-precaution	model,	 the	 cultural	 prevalence	 of	 ritualized	
actions	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 seem	 to	 subdue,	 at	 least	 temporarily,	
human	 fears	 for	 potential	 hazards.	 The	 model	 proposes	 that	 ritualized	 actions	 (like	
counting	 and	 ordering)	 flood	 working	 memory,	 thereby	 temporarily	 appeasing	 our	
worries	 and	 fears,	 especially	 about	 events	 that	 are	 causally	 opaque.	 In	 persons	 with	
obsessive	compulsive	disorder	 (OCD),	 this	strategy	goes	awry,	but	neurotypical	people	
also	 engage	 in	 OCD-like	 behavior	 to	 assuage	 their	 trepidations.	 For	 example,	 many	
athletes	will	don	their	lucky	socks	before	a	competition.		
	 The	 hypothesized	 hazard-precaution	 system	 is	 a	 biological	 neural	 network	
specialized	 in	 foreseeing	 hazards,	 always	 on	 the	 lookout	 for	 potential	 dangers	 (not	
immediate	dangers,	which	are	handled	by	other	parts	of	the	brain),	such	as	a	sharp	knife	
lying	near	a	playing	toddler.	Some	dangers	cannot	be	immediately	resolved,	for	instance,	
droughts	 are	 potentially	 catastrophic	 and	 can	 cost	 lives,	 but	 people	 are	 unable	 to	
remedy	 the	 situation.	 When	 people	 are	 confronted	 with	 such	 intractable	 potential	
dangers,	 they	 engage	 in	 ritualized	 actions	 that	 are	 ostensibly	 aimed	 at	 solving	 these	
problems.	Through	their	complex	structure,	rituals	engage	working	memory,	detracting	
from	 the	 worries	 at	 hand,	 and	 thereby	 have	 a	 soothing	 effect.	 This	 relief	 is	 at	 best	
temporary,	 and	 an	 over-reliance	 on	 rituals	 might	 even	 have	 the	 opposite	 long-term	
effect	and	increase	anxiety:	since	ritual	systems	often	stipulate	that	incorrectly	carrying	
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out	rituals	has	great	costs,	they	can	become	a	new	source	of	worries.		
	 Because	 of	 the	 way	 they	 strongly	 resonate	 with	 the	 hazard-precaution	 system,	
rituals—including	 religious	 rituals—become	 appealing	 to	 individuals	 and	 are	 culturally	
successful.	 The	 hazard-precaution	 model	 is	 thus	 not	 an	 adaptationist	 account	 of	
religious	rituals,	since	Boyer	and	Liénard	(2006)	do	not	think	that	religious	rituals	solve	
adaptive	 problems.	 Rather,	 theirs	 is	 a	 byproduct	 account	 where	 religious	 rituals	 are	
actually	maladaptive,	but	they	are	culturally	successful	because	of	the	way	the	hazard-
precaution	 system	 responds	 to	 them.	 Indeed,	 according	 to	 Boyer	 and	 Liénard	 (2006),	
rituals	 do	 not	 seem	 effective	 at	 placating	 worries	 in	 the	 long	 term	 but	 merely	 offer	
temporary	solace.		
	
4.2	Religious	rituals	as	costly	signals	
According	 to	 Joseph	 Bulbulia	 (2004)	 and	 Richard	 Sosis	 (e.g.,	 Sosis	 and	 Alcorta	 2003),	
religious	 practices	 are	 honest,	 costly	 signals	 of	 commitment	 to	 a	 cooperative	 group.	
Large-scale	human	societies	are	faced	with	the	problem	of	subversion	from	within—on	
the	 whole,	 everyone	 does	 better	 if	 each	 behaves	 altruistically	 toward	 fellow	 group	
members,	but	each	individual	member	is	better	off	freeriding	and	reaping	the	benefits	
of	 other	 cooperators	 without	 contributing	 anything.	 As	 believing	 that	 one	 is	 being	
watched	 increases	 prosocial	 behavior	 (see	 e.g.,	 Bateson,	 Nettle	 and	 Roberts	 2006),	
belief	 in	 watchful	 gods	 can	 make	 groups	 more	 cooperative,	 providing	 group-level	
adaptive	benefits.	
	 To	deter	potential	cheaters	(who	do	not	share	the	relevant	religious	beliefs)	from	
joining	 religious	 groups,	 membership	 requires	 time-	 and	 energy-consuming	 signals	 of	
religious	 commitment:	 “By	 producing	 and	 detecting	 hard-to-fake	 signals	 of	 religious	
commitment,	 the	 god-fearing	 can	 certify	 authentic	 exchange	 partners,	 sifting	 impious	
outlaws	from	the	devout”	(Bulbulia	2004,	p.	668).	Such	signals	could	include	abstaining	
from	alcohol	 and	other	 foods	 (especially	meats),	 refraining	 from	pleasurable	activities	
such	 as	 recreational	 sex	 or	 dancing,	 participating	 in	 time-consuming	 activities	 such	 as	
religious	services	and	public	prayer,	or	wearing	clothes	that	mark	one	as	a	member	of	
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the	 community	 in	 question,	 and	 that	 can	 potentially	make	 one	 a	 target	 of	 ridicule	 or	
hate.	
	 The	costly	signaling	hypothesis	 is	corroborated	by	a	study	of	religious	communes	
in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 which	 consistently	 enjoyed	 higher	
longevity	 than	 communes	 based	 on	 secular	 principles.	 At	 any	 given	 time,	 religious	
communes	were	four	times	more	likely	to	survive	than	secular	ones	(Sosis	and	Bressler	
2003).	 Since	 a	 common	 cause	 for	 a	 commune’s	 dissolution	 is	 high	 rates	of	 freeriding,	
this	 suggests	 that	 religious	 communes	 are	 more	 successful	 at	 deterring	 potential	
freeriders.	This	observation	is	in	line	with	the	economic	viability	of	religious	kibbutzim	in	
Israel,	which	is	higher	than	that	of	secular	kibbutzim	of	comparable	size.	Sosis	and	Ruffle	
(2007)	 used	 a	 controlled	 experimental	 situation	 to	 further	 test	 this	 hypothesis—an	
economic	 game	where	 commune	members	 could	 freely	 donate	 an	 amount	 of	money	
received	 from	 the	 experimenter	 to	 a	 fellow	 commune	 member.	 They	 found	 that	
religious	 kibbutzim	 members	 were	 more	 generous	 towards	 fellow	 members	 than	
secular	kibbutzim	members.	
	 In	 costly	 signaling	 theory,	 the	 signal	 works	 because	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 display	 for	
someone	who	is	honest	than	for	the	dishonest	signaler	(e.g.,	a	peacock’s	tail	works	as	a	
costly	signal	 for	quality	as	a	mate,	because	a	fitter	 individual	has	fewer	problems	with	
the	 cumbersome	 appendage,	 including	 fewer	 parasites,	 better	 ability	 to	 outrun	 a	
predator,	than	an	unfit	male).	In	the	case	of	religious	rituals,	people	who	are	committed	
to	a	religious	faith	are	more	willing	and	able	to	engage	in	costly	displays	to	signal	their	
commitment,	and	thus	it	is	less	costly	to	them	to	display	group	membership	than	it	is	for	
a	non-believer.	
	 While	religious	rituals	 improve	group	cohesion,	they	also	contribute	to	 increased	
hostility	 toward	 outgroup	 members,	 which	 manifests	 itself	 in	 a	 bias	 by	 religious	
believers	against	atheists	and	people	from	other	denominations	(see	Gervais	2013,	for	
review),	and	a	positive	correlation	between	church	affiliation	and	racism	in	the	US	(Hall,	
Matz	and	Wood	2010).	Acts	of	terrorism,	especially	suicide	terrorism,	are	in	a	sense	the	
ultimate	costly	signal	toward	one’s	religious	group	(Atran	2002).	
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5.	Articulating	the	etiological	challenge	to	religious	rituals	
	
An	evolutionary	debunking	challenge	to	religious	rituals	could	go	as	follows:	
1.	If	ritual	religious	practices	(RRPs)	are	successful,	they	are	forms	of	knowing-how	
to	engage	God.	
2.	Evolutionary	accounts	of	RRPs	suggest	that	the	original	functions	of	many	(if	not	
all)	RRPs	are	anxiety-relief	or	promotion	of	group	cohesion.	
3.	If	the	original	functions	of	many	(if	not	all)	RRPs	are	anxiety-relief	or	promotion	
of	group	cohesion,	then	they	are	unlikely	to	be	successful	ways	to	engage	God.	
4.	If	many	(if	not	all)	RRPs	are	unlikely	to	be	successful	ways	to	engage	God,	then	
they	are	unlikely	to	be	forms	of	knowing-how	to	engage	God.	
5.	Conclusion	 (by	modus	 tollens):	Given	what	 the	evolutionary	accounts	of	RRPs	
suggest,	many	(if	not	all)	RRPs	are	unlikely	to	be	forms	of	knowing-how	to	engage	
God.	
	
Premise	1	 is	based	on	Cuneo’s	 (2014,	2016)	account	of	 ritual	knowledge.	Premise	2	 is	
based	on	the	evolutionary	accounts	outlined	in	section	4.	Premise	3	seems	problematic,	
given	that	several	practices	that	are	now	regarded	as	successful	arose	serendipitously.		
	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 knowledge-how	 is	 less	 susceptible	 to	 luck	 conditions	 than	
knowledge-that.	Consider	the	practices	that	led	to	the	empirical	discovery	of	the	cosmic	
microwave	 background	 radiation	 (CMB).	 In	 1964,	 Arno	 Penzias	 and	 Robert	Woodrow	
Wilson	were	experimenting	with	a	highly	 sensitive	horn	antenna,	built	 to	detect	 radio	
waves.	 They	 found	 an	 inexplicable,	 low	 noise,	 seemingly	 evenly	 spread	 over	 the	 sky.	
They	first	thought	this	was	caused	by	defects	or	interference	in	the	measurements	(e.g.,	
pigeon	 droppings),	 but	 soon	 realized	 they	 had	 empirically	 confirmed	 the	 theoretical	
prediction	that	 the	Big	Bang	had	 left	 traces	 in	 the	universe.	While	 the	current	aims	of	
CMB	detection	deviate	from	the	original	aims,	this	does	not	cast	doubt	on	the	efficacy	
and	 success	 of	 the	 current	 and	 improved	 CMB	 detection.	 Similarly,	 even	 if	 rituals	
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originally	 functioned	 to	 relieve	 anxiety	 or	 improve	 group	 cohesion,	 they	 could,	 upon	
reevaluation,	be	repurposed—in	this	case,	for	engaging	God.		
	 In	Cuneo’s	account,	the	function	of	the	Eastern	Orthodox	liturgy	is	to	engage	God,	
to	get	an	intimate	knowledge	of	God	that	cannot	be	acquired	by	disengaged	reasoning	
alone.	 More	 specifically,	 Cuneo	 holds	 that	 the	 liturgy	 helps	 to	 bridge	 the	 epistemic	
distance	between	humans	and	God	that	is	caused	by	sin.	The	debunker	could	challenge	
this	alleged	function	by	claiming	that	the	best	evolutionary	explanations	of	RRPs	do	not	
invoke	 God	 and	 original	 sin,	 but	 rather,	 the	 cultural	 evolution	 of	 practices	 that	 bring	
individual	short-term	solace	(Boyer	and	Liénard)	or	that	help	people	to	cooperate	better	
(Sosis,	Bulbulia).	Premise	3	can	be	revised	in	the	following	way:	
	 	
	 3*.	The	evolutionary	explanations	of	many	(if	not	all)	RRPs	on	offer	(anxiety-relief	
or	promotion	of	group	cohesion)	are	explanatorily	sufficient.		
	
	 There	 are	 two	 difficulties	 with	 this	 revised	 premise.	 First,	 CSR	 has	 a	
methodologically	 naturalistic	 framework,	 so	 it	 assumes	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 religious	
phenomena,	 such	 as	 rituals	 and	 religious	 experiences,	 have	 naturalistic	 explanations.	
While	one	 can	argue	 that	methodological	 naturalism	 implies	philosophical	 naturalism,	
this	is	not	a	straightforward	or	uncontroversial	inference,	but	I	will	not	go	into	this	here.		
Second,	 current	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 work	 in	 CSR	 is	 nowhere	 near	 offering	 an	
exhaustive	account	of	RRPs.	But	even	if	CSR	had	such	an	account	on	offer,	it	would	still	
be	coherent	 to	argue	that	 religious	rituals	have	these	evolved	origins	and	yet	are	also	
ways	of	engaging	God	successfully.	Put	differently,	the	defender	of	RRPs	can	easily	resist	
a	revised	premise	4:	
	
	 4*.	 If	 the	 evolutionary	 explanations	 for	many	 (if	 not	 all)	 RRPs	 are	 explanatorily	
sufficient,	then	RRPs	are	unlikely	to	be	successful	ways	to	engage	God.	
	 	
	 If	 the	 rituals	 engage	 God,	 then	 Eastern	 Orthodox	 Christians	 do	 know	 how	 to	
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engage	God,	even	while	being	aware	of	this	argument.	Orthodox	believers	would	then	
be	like	Dan,	the	amateur	lutenist.	Even	if	he	knew	that	all	copies	contain	printing	errors	
(but	 did	 not	 know	 his	 copy	was	 error-free),	 he	 would	 know	 how	 to	 play	Melancholy	
Galliard4.	In	this	way,	knowing-how	seems	to	escape	debunking	challenges.		
	 However,	under	 some	circumstances	etiological	accounts	do	seem	to	cast	doubt	
on	 the	 religious	 practices	 that	 result	 from	 them.	 Consider	 the	 practice	 of	 selling	
indulgences	 at	 hefty	 prices	 in	 the	 Roman	 Catholic	 Church.	 Early	 Protestant	 authors	
criticized	 this	 practice	 because	 it	 lined	 the	 pockets	 of	 the	 clergy.	 It	 is	 metaphysically	
possible,	 and	 in	 line	 with	 Roman	 Catholic	 doctrine,	 that	 indulgences	 really	 help	 to	
shorten	the	time	a	deceased	person	has	to	spend	in	purgatory.	But	seeing	how	rich	the	
Roman	Catholic	Church	became	as	a	result	of	the	practice	casts	doubt	on	its	legitimacy.	
The	explanation	in	monetary	terms	makes	it	highly	doubtful	that	this	practice	succeeds	
in	 its	 purported	 aim	 of	 shortening	 the	 punishment	 of	 deceased	 family	members	 and	
friends.	As	a	 second	example,	 consider	Cargo	 cults	 in	Melanesia,	Oceania.	Cargo	 cults	
arose	 during	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 and	 especially	 during	 the	
Second	 World	 War,	 when	 the	 local	 populations	 were	 first	 confronted	 with	 western	
airplanes	bringing	material	goods	(such	as	weapons	and	food)	to	the	military	personnel	
stationed	on	the	islands.	Unaware	of	the	origins	of	these	objects,	practitioners	of	cargo	
cults	 believed	 them	 to	 be	 bestowed	by	 ancestors.	 They	 engaged	 in	 ritualistic	 actions,	
including	 installing	mock	 airstrips	 and	 paddles	 to	 signal	 airplanes	 to	 land	 and	 offload	
their	 cargo.	 In	 this	 situation,	 it	would	 seem	 that	 the	origin	of	 the	practice	 (contact	of	
Melanesian	 people	 with	 airplanes	 and	 misinterpreting	 them	 as	 being	 sent	 by	 the	
ancestors)	invalidates	the	practices	of	cargo	cults.	It	might	still	be	possible	that	there	are	
Melanesian	 ancestors	 who	 use	 planes	 in	 this	 way	 to	 provide	 their	 descendants	 with	
material	goods,	but	it	seems	unlikely.	
	 The	cargo	cult	example	illustrates	that	at	least	under	some	conditions	learning	the	
origins	of	a	practice	can	undermine	our	justification	in	believing	that	this	practice	will	be	
successful	in	what	it	purports	to	do,	in	this	case,	communicating	with	the	ancestors.	One	
could	argue	that	the	cargo	cult	members	happen	to	be	lucky	that	the	etiology	of	their	
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practice	 helps	 them	 contact	 the	 ancestors,	 or	 perhaps	 even	 that	 the	 ancestors	
engineered	 the	 events	 in	 the	 Pacific	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 so	 that	 their	
descendants	would	come	to	connect	with	them	in	this	way.	Still,	this	explanation	seems	
contrived.		
	 While	 individual	 examples	 are	 helpful,	 a	 more	 principled	 account	 of	 when	 the	
etiology	of	a	practice	casts	doubt	on	its	rationality	is	in	order.	For	the	etiology	of	beliefs,	
Vavova	(2018,	145)	argues	for	the	following	principle:		
	
Good	Independent	Reason	Principle	(GIRP).	To	the	extent	that	you	have	good	
independent	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 you	are	mistaken	with	 respect	 to	p,	 you	
must	revise	your	confidence	in	p	accordingly—insofar	as	you	can.		
	
	 So,	 for	example,	 suppose	one	becomes	aware	 that	one’s	belief	was	 formed	as	a	
result	 of	 a	 subconscious	 prime	 in	 a	 psychological	 experiment,	 then	 one	 has	 good	
independent	reasons	to	think	that	the	belief	is	mistaken,	since	priming	is	not	generally	a	
good	 way	 of	 forming	 beliefs.	 GIRP	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 practices.	 If	 the	 etiology	 of	 a	
practice	suggests	that	it	 is	unlikely	that	the	practice	will	accomplish	what	it	sets	out	to	
do,	we	 have	 good	 independent	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	 the	 practice	 is	 successful	 in	 its	
(epistemic	 and	 other)	 aims.	 I	will	 term	 etiological	 explanations	 for	 practices	 that	 give	
one	 good	 independent	 reason	 to	 think	 the	 practice	 is	 unsuccessful	 “sinister,”	 and	
neutral	 or	positive	explanations	 “benign”5.	 This	provides	 the	 correct	 intuitions	 for	 the	
indulgences,	cargo	cults,	and	CMB	detection.	 Indulgences	have	poor	scriptural	support	
but	conveniently	 line	pockets,	so	we	have	good	independent	reason	to	doubt	that	the	
practice	shortens	time	spent	in	purgatory.	The	etiology	of	cargo	cults	is	likewise	sinister,	
as	 it	provides	good	 independent	 reason	 to	doubt	 that	ancestors	are	 trying	 to	connect	
with	practitioners	of	the	cargo	cults.	By	contrast,	 there	 is	nothing	about	the	history	of	
CMB	detection	that	prompts	us	to	doubt	that	this	practice	really	detects	traces	of	 the	
Big	 Bang.	 Indeed,	 when	 Penzias	 and	 Wilson	 were	 experimenting	 with	 their	 super-
sensitive	 radio	 antenna	 to	 detect	 radio	 waves,	 it	 is	 unsurprising	 they	 detected	 CMB,	
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since	it	emits	a	similar	signal	to	what	they	set	out	to	detect,	so	this	etiology	is	benign.		
	 Debunking	challenges	tend	to	involve	sinister	factors.	For	instance,	Hume’s	(1757)	
account	of	the	origins	of	theism	presents	a	challenge	to	the	rationality	of	theistic	beliefs	
because	 the	 psychological	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 involved,	 anxiety,	 uncertainty,	 and	
wishful	 thinking,	 are	 sinister.	 They	 are	 sinister	 because	 in	 general	 trying	 to	 counter	
ignorance	 through	 ad	 hoc	 explanations	 and	 wishful	 thinking	 are	 poor	 ways	 to	 form	
beliefs.	 They	 give	 us	 good	 independent	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	 resulting	 beliefs.	 The	
revised	premise	3	then	becomes:	 		
	
3**.	The	evolutionary	explanations	of	RRPs	on	offer	(anxiety-relief	or	promotion	of	
group	cohesion)	often	involve	sinister	factors.			
	
The	new	fourth	premise	reads:	
	
4**.	If	the	evolutionary	explanations	of	RRPs	involve	sinister	factors,	then	many	(if	
not	all)	RRPs	are	unlikely	to	be	successful	ways	to	engage	God.	
	
	 Are	 premise	 3**	 and	 4**	 plausible?	 They	 are,	 when	 we	 assume	 an	 Anselmian	
concept	 of	 God.	 Both	 the	 hazard-precaution	model	 and	 the	 cooperation	model	 raise	
doubts	 that	 an	 omnibenevolent,	 omniscient,	 and	 omnipotent	 God	 would	 choose	 to	
engage	with	people	through	these	evolutionary	routes.		
	 The	 hazard-precaution	model	 suggests	 rituals	 relieve	 anxiety.	 On	 the	 face	 of	 it,	
anxiety-relief	is	a	good	thing.	However,	rituals	do	not	directly	address	the	source	of	the	
worries	they	are	supposed	to	appease.	Moreover,	Boyer	and	Liénard	(2006)	think	that	
rituals	are	not	even	particularly	effective	at	alleviating	them.	In	the	long	run,	rituals	do	
not	provide	a	genuine	solution	for	the	anxieties	they	are	designed	to	appease	and	may	
even	create	new	problems	(e.g.,	worries	arising	from	incorrect	performances	of	rituals,	
or	neglecting	to	perform	rituals).	Analogously,	psychological	treatments	of	OCD	typically	
involve	cognitive	behavioral	therapy,	such	as	gradually	facing	one’s	fears,	which	should	
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lead	to	a	decrease	of	the	compulsive	behaviors	(e.g.,	excessive	hand	washing).		
	 The	cooperation	model	fares	slightly	better	as	it	predicts	benefits,	such	as	ingroup	
solidarity	and	cohesion,	to	social	groups	that	engage	in	RRPs.	But	problematically,	it	also	
predicts	 that	 RRPs	 give	 rise	 to	 (or	 at	 any	 rate	 help	 consolidate)	 hostility	 to	 outgroup	
members	 that	 can,	 in	extremis,	 culminate	 in	acts	of	warfare,	pogroms,	 and	 terrorism.	
Atran	 and	Ginges	 (2012)	 identified	 religious	 rituals	 both	 as	 a	 great	 source	 of	 ingroup	
solidarity	and	of	outgroup	hostility,	giving	rise	to	intergroup	conflicts	that	are	difficult	to	
resolve	with	standard	negotiation	techniques.	On	the	other	hand,	Cuneo	(2016,	chapter	
6)	 has	 argued	 that	 RRPs	 need	 not	 have	 these	 pernicious	 effects.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	
Eastern	Orthodox	liturgy	both	promotes	an	ethic	of	proximity—attending	to	those	near	
and	 dear	 to	 us—and	 an	 ethic	 of	 outwardness,	 helping	 outgroup	 members.	 Still,	
historical	records	indicate	that	Eastern	Orthodox	churches	did	not	escape	the	problem	
of	ingroup-based	hostility:	examples	include	the	iconoclastic	periods	and	the	torture	of	
the	Eastern	Orthodox	theologian	Maximus	Confessor	(whose	tongue	was	ripped	out	and	
right	 hand	 cut	 off),	 who	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 heretic	 because	 he	 did	 not	 accept	
monothelitism,	 the	 view	 that	 Jesus	 Christ	 has	 two	 natures	 but	 only	 one	 will.	 An	
explanation	 for	why	 theological	minutiae	 about	 pictures	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 Christ	 can	
give	rise	to	violence	is	that	religious	practices	increase	ingroup	cohesion	at	the	expense	
of	outgroup	cohesion	(see	e.g.,	Teehan	2003).	Even	though	the	Eastern	Orthodox	church	
has	liturgical	texts	that	exhort	their	congregants	to	pray	for	outgroup	members,	such	as	
the	 poor	 and	 strangers,	 the	RRPs	 themselves	 create	 a	 sense	 of	 ingroup	 cohesion	 and	
hostility	toward	others.		
	 Under	the	assumption	that	God	 is	omnibenevolent,	 it	 is	peculiar	that	God	would	
engage	with	 us,	 using	 these	particular	mechanisms.	Why	would	God	use	mechanisms	
that	result	 in	outgroup	hostility,	warfare,	and	terrorism?	Of	course,	 there	are	 limits	 to	
using	 psychology	 in	 trying	 to	 infer	what	 an	Anselmian	God	would	 do	 to	 interact	with	
humans.	 Rea	 (2016),	 for	 instance,	 has	 argued	 that	 proponents	 of	 the	 hiddenness	
argument	 draw	 too	 strongly	 on	 a	 parent	 analogy	 in	 their	 assumption	 that	 God	must	
always	 be	 seeking	 out	 an	 active,	 loving	 relationship.	 However,	 even	 without	 explicit	
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appeal	to	divine	psychology,	it	would	seem	surprising—all	things	being	equal—that	RRPs	
would	have	these	sinister	 features,	whereas	 this	observation	 is	 less	surprising	under	a	
naturalistic,	 deistic,	 or	 other	 view	 that	 does	 not	 assume	God’s	 omnibenevolence	 and	
active	intervention.		
	 Thus,	while	 the	 etiology	 of	 RRPs	 does	 not	 rule	 out	 that	 humans	would	 connect	
with	God	through	rituals,	the	etiological	accounts	outlined	here	(which	are	the	main	CSR	
accounts	 about	 rituals	 on	 offer)	make	 this	 doubtful6.	 They	 give	 us	 good	 independent	
reason	to	think	that	the	practice	is	not	successful	in	engaging	God.		
	
6.	Conclusion	
	
This	 paper	 has	 examined	whether	 a	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 from	beliefs	 to	 practices	might	
provide	 a	way	 to	 elude	etiological	 challenges	 to	 religion.	 Taking	Cuneo’s	 (2014,	 2016)	
model	 of	 ritual	 knowledge	 as	 a	 point	 of	 focus,	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 one	 can	 raise	
evolutionary	debunking	challenges	to	religious	rituals	as	well.	Religious	ritual	practices	
are	not	immune	to	etiological	challenges,	since	they	have	purported	doxastic	aims	(e.g.,	
knowing	 God),	 and	 evolutionary	 considerations	 can	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	
practices	are	likely	to	be	successful	in	these	aims.	Two	influential	evolutionary	accounts	
of	 religious	 ritual,	 the	 hazard-precaution	 model	 and	 costly	 signaling	 theory,	 are	 not	
metaphysically	incompatible	with	the	idea	that	religious	ritual	practices	engage	God,	but	
cast	doubt	on	whether	such	practices	would	successfully	engage	God.		
	
Oxford	Brookes	University	
	
Acknowledgments		
The	 author	wishes	 to	 thank	Matthew	 Benton,	 Laura	 Callahan,	 John	 Hawthorne,	 Hans	
Van	 Eyghen,	 Johan	 De	 Smedt,	 Richard	 Sosis,	 Jordan	 Kiper,	 and	 two	 anonymous	
reviewers	for	comments	on	an	earlier	version	of	this	paper.		
	
	 18	
Notes	
(1)	In	that	respect,	it	is	peculiar	that	many	philosophers	of	religion	(e.g.,	Plantinga	2000)	
engage	with	Feuerbach,	Marx,	and	Freud,	 rather	 than	with	more	 recent,	 scientifically-
grounded	etiological	accounts.	
	
(2)	With	thanks	to	Richard	Sosis	and	Jordan	Kiper	for	making	their	position	explicit	in	a	
personal	communication.	
	
(3)	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	knowledge-how	 is	not	sensitive	 to	 luck	conditions	at	all.	For	
instance,	 someone	 who	 makes	 some	 random	 tweaks	 in	 her	 broken	 dishwasher,	 and	
happens	to	fix	it	that	way,	does	not	know	how	to	repair	dishwashers.	
	
(4)	With	thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	me	on	this	point.		
	
(5)	 I	 owe	 the	 terms	 “sinister”	 and	 “benign”	 to	 John	 Hawthorne	 and	 Laura	 Callahan,	
respectively.	
	
(6)	Teehan	(2016,	p.	49)	makes	a	related	point	 in	his	discussion	of	the	problem	of	evil	
and	 theodicy	 in	 the	 light	 of	 CSR.	 He	 argues	 that,	 under	 CSR	 explanations,	 “the	
establishment	 of	 a	 moral	 bias	 against	 other	 groups	 is	 a	 design	 feature	 of	 our	 moral	
minds,”	which	makes	God	responsible	for	moral	evil.		
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